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Housing was a latecomer to the federal trough. The federal government historically made war, killed Indians, gave away land, tried cases, raised taxes, regulated
business, and appropriated money. It hardly ever built houses, except for itself, its
soldiers, and its prisoners. But in the last generation or so, the federal government has
begun to make up for lost time. It has begun building and financing houses. The
Wagner Housing Act, enacted in 1937,1 was only a first step. The federal housing
effort now has a cabinet department of its own-a status higher than that of food and
drugs, the Army, and social security, all of which have to be content with representation at the sub-cabinet level. The new status is evidence of a new emphasis-or at
least evidence of a nagging feeling in society that something is wrong and that something must be done. Specifically, what is wrong is the slums.
It is still a question, however, whether the main federal effort in housing will go
toward slum housing or toward something else. In the i93os stress was placed on
housing the lower working class. In the 1940s defense workers and veterans were the
prime beneficiaries of federal action. In the i95os emphasis was placed on middleincome housing in the suburbs, and upper-income housing in the renewed urban core.
Only in the i96os does it seem even possible that the desperate urban poor will move
to the center of the stage. And even that is an open question.
Government emphasis (and money) is never a matter of whim. It is a matter of
cash and of votes; of letters from home addressed to Congress; of riots and lawsuits
and pressures. Concrete social forces have determined why government has done
what it has done in the field of housing. Concrete social forces have similarly determined why it has not done the things that have not yet been done. This short overview will discuss the federal effort to eliminate the slums and provide decent homes
for the poorest of the poor, in terms of the social forces that have made the job so far
so hard. Clearly the slums have not been eliminated. Clearly many of the poor
remain locked in their ghettos, in dark, dank, overcrowded rooms. Clearly, the situation is unhappy. Can we shed any light on the causes and cures?
I
SLUM HOUSING: THE PROBLEM

It is natural for people to think of problems in absolute terms. Most people
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believe that air pollution, the population explosion, the gold flow, and increasing
crime rates are threats to humanity in an objectively measurable sense. Yet it is important to note that a problem is also-and primarily-a state of mind. A problem
is a situation that worries some segment of the population. If there is no worry, there
is no problem. The air remains polluted, but there is no pressure for political and
social action. A "problem" exists, then, only to the extent it is so perceived. Otherwise, it is like the noise of a tree falling in an empty forest.
There is no question, at least not now, that slum housing is a problem. Three
groups of people see it that way. One group is composed of some of the people who
live in the slums. Another is composed of some outsiders. The third is made up
of some elected and appointed government officials. But each group sees the problem
in a very different light.
The person who lives in the slums, if he thinks of his housing condition as a problem, feels his situation as a personal trouble. It is a deficiency in his own standard
of living, a source of discomfort, stigma, and pain. The outsider cannot see slum
housing in this way: his own house is in order. His perception of the slum housing
problem, then, cannot be the same as that of the poor themselves. The outsider may
have, instead of a perception of a problem, a perception of an interest. Some people
have a direct, material stake in government housing programs. Among these are
manufacturers of building supplies and labor unions whose members are bricklayers
and masons. Similarly, cement companies have a direct interest in the federal highway
program. This kind of interest has played an important and pervasive role in the
history of Government's housing effort. Building-trade unions, for example, lobbied
vigorously for passage of the New Deal public housing law.2 Landlords with vacant
apartments in marginal neighborhoods welcome the new leasing program' with open
arms, since it promises to put federal rent money in their pockets.
Most people, however, lack strong material interests in any particular item of
legislation. Slum housing affects them only obliquely. Many people do feel that
slum housing is a threat, not to them individually and directly, but indirectly, because
it is a threat to the collectivity of which they are a part. One might call this the
social interest. In a way it differs from direct interests only in degree. The citizen
may oppose air pollution because a factory next door is pouring malodorous smoke in
his window, or because the air in a city he likes to visit is slightly brown and acrid in
the gills. Both problems affect him, but in different ways. Vast numbers of people
feel a social interest in a wide range of problems.
The first laws that had anything whatsoever to do with slum housing were fire
laws Fires can begin in the slums and spread to the better parts of town. They endangered some people directly, but many more indirectly. It has always been easy to
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denounce the slums, not for any welfare motive or motive of heart, but because the
slum threatens the safety of his city. Similarly, the slums have been called a social
danger because they are alleged to breed crime, socialism, boss-rule, or disease. Jacob
Riis told the world that the tenements were "hot-beds of the epidemics that carry
death to rich and poor alike; the nurseries of pauperism and crime," which bred "a
scum of ... human wrecks... [and] maintain a standing army of ten thousand
tramps."5 The Boston Anti-Tenement House League helped induce Massachusetts
to enact a law "to Prevent the Manufacture and Sale of Clothing Made in Unhealthy
Places."" The idea was that in tenement sweatshops, dread germs were transmitted
to the clothes. These germs spread sickness to the people who bought and wore the
clothes. Any reader can think of pungent contemporary examples-appeals to
reform the slums in order to roll back Communism or achieve some other social result.
Finally, there is pure disinterest-the reform motivation. Some people have
worked to improve the life of the poor for no outward reasons of personal or social
gain. Conscience and conviction have been powerful engines of social change.
The history of housing legislation has been full of individual heroes-men like Jacob
Riis, or Lawrence Veiller, who was the soul and spirit behind the New York Tenement House Law of I9o7. 7 Reformers cannot, as a general rule, induce people to
betray what they consider their direct individual interests. But they can persuade
people where their indirect, social interests lie. Hence reformers have been enormously important, as catalysts and propagandists.
What is the interest of government? There are, to be sure, bureaucratic interests.
Department heads will fight tooth and nail to get a program into their bailiwick
rather than someone else's. They will lobby for programs that strengthen their
position or aggrandize their empire. But in general, the governmental interest is
quite different from the nongovernmental interest. Abstractly stated, it is the interest
in satisfying the most outside demands at the least possible cost to itself.
The governmental interest is worth dwelling on. In some ways, it is the critical
interest. The subject matter of this article is a body of law: enacted programs of
government. But government is not usually an initiator; it reacts. It responds to
demands made upon it. These demands are evoked by other people with interests,
direct or indirect, in situations which appear to the demandants as problems. Government responds; but it filters demands through the special needs of government as an
institution or a system. The basic need is for equilibrium, for balance, for stability.
It is a need to respond while incurring as little cost as possible, and running as few
risks as possible. Now cost is not meant in a narrow literal sense. Losing an election
is a cost to a Congressman or President, indeed, the highest cost of all. Some
responses to demands call for costs in the obvious monetary sense. If a program
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promises to be expensive, taxes may have to be raised. Or alternative programs may
have to be foregone. But these may cause grumbling, disturbances, angry letters,
threats to withhold votes and contributions, or even riots in extreme cases. The ideal
program would be one that pleased everybody. Such programs, needless to say, are
few and far between. All others involve a measure of cost.
The remarks above are elementary and perhaps hardly worth the mention. But
the course of housing history makes no rational sense from any other point of
view. The history of housing legislation, all in all, makes no ethical sense, no
economic sense, no social sense. But it makes sense in terms of the system needs
of political bodies. Yet this dimension is frequently ignored. The rise of a federal
housing program is often taken to be a sign that good is finally prevailing over evil.
Social scientists have discarded as useless the notion of progress-a one-line movement of society from the bad to the good. But the concept of progress hangs on in the
folk mind with an iron grip. Ideas of good and bad are valuable, even necessary.
They tell us what to work for. But they are very bad at explaining the past. The
past is best accounted for by rigorous search for direct and indirect interests, among
the relevant actors, and by careful consideration of the governmental interest. Government, after all, is a crucial player in the game. Government, the body that makes
and enforces law, is a vast institution; and it is made up of ordinary men. To assume
that these men are inclined to maximize responses at minimum cost, is to assume only
that they are terribly human. This primitive assumption brings light into fields of
great darkness.
II
ON MAJoITY RuLE

Political life, in this country, follows roughly the principle of majority rule.
This principle, baldly stated, is very abstract. But one can draw several corollaries
from it. First, it is clear that government will ordinarily serve majority interests,
not minority interests, when the two are sharply defined, and in conflict. Often
enough, the two are sharply defined, and do conflict. And government sides with
the loudest and most numerous voice.
In the United States, there is a huge middle class. It outnumbers by far both the
rich and the poor. Hence there is a deeply ingrained, inverterate slippage of poverty
programs into middle class programs. The American public housing movement
itself provides one long verification of this statement. America never had any public
housing to speak of until the period just after the First World War, when a few
sporadic programs were launched in the statesP Massachusetts and North Dakota
(an unlikely pair) were among the pioneering states. Both programs, however, were
'During the First World War, the federal government began a program to house workers in shipyards and defense industries. After the war, the program was quickly dismantled. Act of March 1, 1z18,
ch. 19, 40 Stat. 438; Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 74, 40 Stat. 550; Act of July 59, i9i9, ch. 24, 41 Stat.
224.
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profoundly different from public housing as it developed in the 195os and 196os.

Neither was really interested in the bottom level poor. These programs were rather
geared toward the lower middle class. Massachusetts's plan was explicitly designed for
"mechanics, laborers, wage-earners."9 The houses were to be small suburban cottages.
The North Dakota Experiment (r919-i923) called for the construction of homes,

financed by state funds, to be sold to residents of the state.'0 Its main interest was in
the simple farmer-though not the tenant farmer or the migrant farm worker.
Neither plan succeeded, but not because they aimed at the wrong level of society,
politically speaking."
New Deal public housing was of course a more radical program. But it turned
out to be politically feasible only during a period in which millions of the former
middle class had lost their jobs but not their political voices. This was the unique
situation in the days of the great depression. Vast numbers of Americans had become much poorer than they were. Yet in culture and habit, they were still members
of the middle class.' 2 These fallen members of the middle class were to be the
prime beneficiaries of public housing. They were the depression equivalent of the
honest farmers and sturdy mechanics of the North Dakota and Massachusetts experiments. Hence, although public housing tenants had to be poor, they could not be
too poor. They had to be able to pay the rent. The rent was heavily subsidized-but
it was not by any means free. Those who could not pay it, and those who were
deficient in good character, were not to be let in.'3
And even at that, the heyday of public housing lasted only so long as the depression lasted. Its momentum was swept away during the Second World War.
It was only natural to expend wartime and immediate post-war energy on defense
workers and veterans.' 4 Afterwards, the major effort went into assuring middleclass migration into the suburbs. Public housing became a feeble program starved
for funds. New public construction was and is lucky if it equals two per cent of
private housing starts 5 Congress during the i95os came close to killing public
housing altogether. The effect of public housing is cumulative, of course. More
than 2,oooooo people live in public housing. They are oddly distributed, however.
Almost a quarter of them are tenants of the New York City Housing Authority.
'
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And however one counts the poor, public housing has not been an impressive effort at
housing the indigent. Public housing may not be worth doing at all. But this halfway
effort is hard to justify on any theory. It is not hard to explain, however. The
political zest of politicians for programs is a function of the payoff to them in honor or
votes. Even the housing reformers found public housing disgusting by the late
i95os;" and the right wing, especially the real estate right, was paranoid on the
subject. The only flicker of enthusiasm for the program at this low point in public
housing's career was generated by programs to house the elderly. Some cities which
had no interest in the usual sort of public housing mounted substantial plans for
housing the elderly. A high percentage of current housing effort is going into this
programYm The program is eminently worthwhile. But so are others which are
death at the box office-such as anything which even smacks of racial integration
in the suburbs and in the solid middle class areas. Or any infusions of the welfare
poor middle class neighborhoods.
In fact, the enthusiasm for housing the elderly is best explained on political
grounds. The elderly are the last remaining pool of predominantly white, culturally
middle class poor. They tend to be docile. They tend to be grateful. They create
no problems of management and no problems of discipline. Except when afflicted
with the forgetfulness of age, they pay their rent on time. They do not overload
the schools, since they have no children. And they can conveniently be housed in big
towers in the central cities.
Race was mentioned, somewhat offhandedly, in the last paragraph. It deserves a
more pointed treatment. The decline in the fortunes of public housing has gone
hand in hand with the rise in the percentage of Negroes in public housing. Public
housing in the big cities is central city housing; and the central cities are now predominantly Negro ghettoes. The process has been going on for a long time, but
.since the end of the Second World War it has vastly accelerated. Public housing in
-Washington, D.C., is virtually all Negro. Chicago and St. Louis have some whites
in public housing, but not many. In some other cities the percentage of Negroes rises
to seventy, eighty, and ninety per cent or more. At the end of 1965, every single
tenant in Philadelphia's Raymond Rosen Apartments was Negro. This project had
i,-=2 dwelling units 8 The reader does not have to be told what happens to public
support of public housing if public housing means Negro ghettoes. Instead of the

angry marginal whites of the New Deal period, public housing in the big cities is
more and more the home of the most despised and dispossessed group in America: the
urban, problem-family Negro. The more this happens, the more others abandon
public housing-physically, by moving out, and politically, by despising it. The worst
18
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thing about big-city public housing is not that it is shoddy and dreary. 9 The worst
thing is that it is despicable to live there, and that degraded, hopeless people, the
victims of weakness, fate, and prejudice, make their homes there. And the more this
is true, the more the white community reacts with hostility. The very mention of
public housing in the suburbs or in middle class areas is political death. Mayor
Lindsay of New York seems to have the courage to speak the truth; and to demand
that public housing be scattered throughout the city. But he may not have the
power to carry this program out. Government must follow its line of least resistance,
at least as a general rule. It must follow the will of the majority. And the will of
the majority is that public housing stay put in its ghetto.
The story of public housing, then, in sum, indicates the desperate straits of a
program that cannot, will not, or does not accommodate middle class interests. Another good example of the same process is the fate of Aid for Dependent Children.
This too began as a kind of middle class program-for unfortunate but respectable
widows. When, through demographic and economic change, it became a program
primarily (or at least notoriously) for Negro women with big broods of illegitimate
children, the program became unpopular to the point of crisis. It is still subject to
constant congressional and local sniping.20
Government, moreover, is constantly seeking new ways to help those who are
politically grateful and who count. The much touted rent supplement is a case in
point*2 ' As originally proposed, this was a program to benefit the lower middle
class-the "rich poor" as they were called. Congress refused and restricted the
program to the public housing poor. One cannot identify either side as the champions
of the social underdog. That Congress is not is suggested by the fact that the right
wing was as eager to restrict the scope of the rent supplement to the public housing
poor as anyone. Not that the right was deaf to the entreaties of the middle class. But
the spectre which haunts the right is government "competition" with private industry.
Congress has been exceedingly careful-paranoid may be the better word-on this
subject. One example is the provision of the federal public housing law which
requires a twenty per cent gap between the "upper rental limits for admission to
. . .low-rent housing and the lowest rents at which private enterprise unaided by
public subsidy is providing .. .a substantial supply of decent, safe, and sanitary

housing."2' 2 The rent supplement, as originally proposed, raised the fear that
government might invade a private market. This the right could not abide.
For some, keeping government out of competition is a matter of economic
and social principle. It is a principle which has been used to justify letting
"0As if Americans had such elevated aesthetic tastel As if Levittown or the average luxury apartment
were any prettier.
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people die of malnutrition rather than have the state intervene, as if the poor were
Hindu mystics starving to death for a higher cause. Fortunately, for most people,
laissez faire is not a sacred principle at all. It is merely an aspect of selfishness. A
selfish man is not as dangerous as an ideolog; he can always be bribed. The same real
estate interests who fought public housing tooth and nail have, in some cities, eagerly
welcomed a x965 program under which housing authorities lease private apartments
and homes. 3 The program sops up nagging vacancies and gives long-term leases to
landlords, with a government guarantee of the rent. It stays away from low-vacancy
cities. Hence it has been, so far, highly acceptable to landlords and brokers.
The administration originally proposed a rent supplement for the "rich poor." Yet
it fought hard for the congressional plan, which benefits only the public housing poor.
The fight has been hard. The rent supplement has been killed at least twice. Both
times the White House brought it back to life by mouth-to-mouth breathing. It
seemed finally, irrevocably dead, when the summer riots of 1967 brought it back to life
(along with the now famous rat control bill). Yet the altruism of the administration
is rendered doubtful by their original conception; and by their willingness to fight for
a rent supplement--of any kind. One suspects that the administration felt it had to
have a housing program, politically speaking-almost any one would do-and a rent
supplement was part of this program. And the rent supplement (in its 1965 version)
was likely to make jobs, house old people, and please religious and charitable organizations.
It is a hopeful sign that everybody, even arch-conservatives, seems to think a
housing program is either desirable or inevitable. Hence, "alternatives" to present
programs have proliferated, with constant new ideas trotted out by this side or that.
There is the Percy plan, for example, which stresses Americanism and owning-yourown-home 4 It has a quaintly archaic ring. What this plan has in mind seems to be
a neat little village of bungalows, inhabited by the honest (but low-paid) working
-class. Its relevance to the big-city slums is minimal.
III
ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE

The second corollary of our general proposition is that government will seek the
line of financial least resistance. Costly programs mean taxes and taxes are unpopular. Or they mean foregoing genuinely popular programs. Hence direct
government expenditures on housing for the poor are not as attractive as expenditures which stimulate or force somebody else to spend their money. Consequently,
the history of government and housing is a long tale of attempts at stimulation and
force.
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Force is the older technique, and therefore deserves earlier mention. The first
important slum control laws were the tenement house laws. Modern housing codes
differ from these in a number of technical respects, but in essence, they are their
lineal descendants. The first notable tenement house law was passed in New York
in 1867, shortly after a venomous cholera epidemic? 5 Much more influential was the
law of 19oi, which was imitated in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Wisconsin?8 Modern housing codes, essentially, are products of the urban redevelopment and renewal
laws. To qualify for federal gold, communities must have a "workable program."
Among the prerequisites of such a program is a housing code. 7 This is reason
enough to explain the great rush to enact these codes. They have multiplied ten-fold
or more in the last fifteen years.
Housing codes vary a great deal. But the general idea is everywhere the same.
The law sets up minimum standards of decency and maintenance. Overcrowding is
prohibited. Sanitary conditions are insisted upon. Houses must be kept in good repair.
It is obvious to the naked eye that vast tracts in New York, Chicago, and other major
cities could not possibly stand in conformity with any but the most minimal type of
code. Everyone knows that the Negro ghettoes are overcrowded and that conditions
in many of the tenements are appalling. Enforcement of the codes, then, is something
less than perfect. The same was true of their ancestors, the tenement house laws.
Law enforcement is never a simple matter; and the likelihood of enforcement is
different in different cities. A good deal depends upon the resources put into enforcement. Obviously, if the call for enforcement comes only from the minority
poor, no one will listen. But apart from this an essential vice gnaws at the heart of
these laws. It is that the job is basically too big for punitive sanctions to work. The
punitive aspects of housing laws consist not so much in the fact that criminal penalties
are appended to them (though they are), as in the fact that the social burdens under
these laws are distributed in such a lop-sided way. Everyone admits it would take
billions of dollars to clear the slums or upgrade them and give every American a
decent home. Yet if the housing codes were perfectly enforced, every American would
have a minimally decent home. This means that the codes in essence demand that
landlords expend billions of dollars improving their property. But where are those
billions to come from? Not from government, which offers only to pay the policeman and the inspector, but from the landlords themselves.
" Act of May 14, 1867, ch. 908, [1867] N.Y. Laws 2265. See generally C.

ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA

YEARS 175-234 (x962).
" Act of June 29, 19o5,

ch. 178, [x9o5] Conn. Laws 376; Act of March 25, 1904, ch. 61, [1904]
N.J. Laws 96; Act of April 12, i9o, cl. 334, [igoi] N.Y. Laws 889; Act of June 21, 1907, ch. 269,
[1907]

Wis. Laws 9xo.

See generally R. LUiov,

supra note 7, on the background of the New York

law; Friedman & Spector, Tenement House Legislation in Wisconsin: Reform and Reaction, 9 Am. J.
LEGAL HIMT. 41 (1965), osf the background of the Wisconsin law.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (I964, Supp. II, 1965-66). See generally Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban
Renewal, 25 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 1 (1956); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAv. L.
Rav. 8oi (1965).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The only way to justify exclusive use of housing codes in the attack on the slums
would be to assume, as so many are willing to assume, that landlords are heartless
monsters reaping enormous, clandestine profits out of the misery of their tenants' lives.
There is some evidence that these profits are mythical-at least as a general rule.28
No one is certain. What seems likely is that the more dilapidated the building, the
lower the profits. It is, however, inconsistent to argue that slum houses are gold mines,
and then to worry (as the administration and most housing experts worry) about the
difficulties of stimulating investment in low-income housing. Orthodox economists
might point out that if housing the poor were truly a gold mine, capital would rush
into the market. As a matter of fact, slum housing is a poor business from a number
of aspects. It is a high risk, low prestige operation. Apartment houses in the slums
need careful management and constant attention to be profitable. Respectable capital
is leery of this kind of business. What moves in is uninformed capital, marginal
operators-and the disreputable.
But the tenement house laws and housing codes have helped create a climate
inimical to normal, respectable investment. These laws have helped create the unscrupulous landlord. They have invited evasion or corruption of formal enactments.
And they have done so at least in part because the punitive approach is so
cheap and so easy for the government. Passing a housing code calls for the most
minimal sort of public investment. Yet it satisfies the outcry to do something about
the slums. It names a scapegoat (the landlord), and dumps upon him the whole cost
of renovating the national stock of housing. When he fails to respond, government
increases its posture of indignation. It authorizes rent strikes, passes receivership
laws, and fulminates about taking the profit out of the slums.F The same philosophy
lies behind the recent antirioting laws. Congress was faced with demands to do
something about big-city riots. Any real program would have been costly and
controversial. Congress found it cheap and convenient to name a scapegoat instead
and pass a law thundering empty words against the scapegoat. Not a penny had to
be appropriated, not a tax dollar raised. Nobody was offended, except the radical
fringe.
Government has often hit upon an analogous pseudo-solution to the problem of
housing integration. Here government faces a real dilemma. Negroes demand integrated housing. Many white liberals agree, with varying passion and commitment.
Other whites violently disagree, particularly small householders in the suburbs and in
urban ethnic enclaves. From the standpoint of government, the best solution is to
place an ordinance or statute on the books which proclaims the right of Negroes to live
everywhere; and to do nothing further. Actually, the form of these ordinances repre28 See W. KLEIN, LET IN Tm SUN X41-68, 173-74 (1964); Sporn, Empirical Studies in the Economics
of Slum Ownership, 36 L.ND ECON. 333 (196o). A superb treatment is G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT
LANDLORD
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sents a quite typical compromise. Those in favor are not strong enough to ram
through fair housing laws which really sting; those against are not strong enough
to block passage. The compromise takes the form of a ringing symbolic declaration,
coupled with flabby enforcement provisions. When these laws fail to be enforced
(as is usually the case) the liberals cry out for more teeth.
Yet one wonders if the teeth could really bite. The opposition is numerous and
feels the problem deeply. Particularly under these circumstances, the punitive
approach is likely to fail. It satisfies only the natural timidity of government. The path
followed is much like that of the tenement house laws. First, there is a search for a
scapegoat. He is easy to find. The Southern Yahoo, the Polish factory worker, the
suburban Bircher-these will do nicely. To castigate these people may be good for
the soul and for the adrenalin; it does not integrate a city. To move men and change
institutions usually requires more than symbols; it requires the input of actual resources. Those who oppose integration are not merely bigots; they are also frightened
men. They are afraid that their property values will decline, that their schools will
deteriorate, that police and fire protection will vanish, that crime will rise in their
neighborhoods. They feel, in other words, that integration will impose heavy costs
on them. They see nobody willing to help them absorb these costs. Government
offers preachments and punishments. Politically speaking, a perceived cost is as
good as a real cost. Hence, even if the famous decline in property values is illusory,
that people believe in it is important. The white opposition to integration will
continue to avoid, evade, and frustrate racial integration, as long as they feel that
they are asked to bear heavy and unnecessary costs-at no gain to them in any way.
Stimulationhas been as popular a device for government as punishment. The idea
is to sow seed money, which will induce the private sector to invest heavily in lowincome property. Even before the federal seed money days, many hoped that philan-

thropists, out of the goodness of their hearts, would solve the slum problem by building
model tenements to house the poor. The model tenement movement dates from the
middle of the nineteenth century. The philanthropists who built model houses were
genuinely animated by a desire to solve pressing problems of society. Perhaps they
also wished to demonstrate that respectable private business had both the conscience
and the means to do what government could not and would not achieve. Unfortunately, the demonstration failed. Some projects were outright failures; others
avoided housing the poorest of the poor, choosing instead to benefit the lower middle
class and the honest workman. And volume never lived up to expectations. Capital
simply did not flow in any great quantity into the slums30
It became clear that kindhearted millionaires could not, unaided, clear the slums.

30See

generally on the model tenement house movement, id. ch. 3;
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Gingerly, government tried modest subsidies-the right of eminent domain, tax
exemption provisions.
Gradually the incentives have diversified and expanded. Government has become fonder and fonder of the idea, or hope, that private enterprise would rescue it
from its housing dilemma. Housing and Urban Development has become an empire
of little gimmicks and bailiwicks, programs and subprograms, a bewildering, baffling
congeries of devices, many of them motivated by the hope that the market can somehow be galvanized cheaply into life. The government will lend money at belowmarket interest, it will guarantee mortgages, it will subsidize "demonstrations,"
it will support planning and research, it will encourage tearing down and building up-constantly in search of a key that will magically open a wonderful door
of investment. It was recently announced, with trumpets and sennets, from the highest pinnades in Washington that insurance companies were prepared to invest a
billion dollars in the slumsY2 This development fulfilled so many administration
dreams. It met, in part, the demand that something be done about the slums. And
it did so at no cost to government, other than the trifling expense of flattering and
cajoling executives into taking this step. Moreover, investment by this industry might
very well stimulate even more investments by others. Fresh investment in housing
in slum areas, by insurance companies, philanthropists, the Roman Catholic church,
and whoever else has resources and willingness, is of course very welcome-provided
always that demolition, relocation, and rehabilitation are carried on with due attention
to human values. But may one be permitted a note of skepticism? Past experience,
if it is any guide at all, tells us that private investment is unlikely to make more
than a beginning of the job. Low-rent housing must show a profit to attract anyone
but philanthropists. And philanthropists are not rich enough, or are too fickle, to
mount a sustained attack on the problem. The private effort, then, tends to falter, at
which point heavier and heavier subsidies are needed. But it was such subsidies that
government wished to avoid in the first place.
CONCLUSION

Is there any hope that the poor will be decently housed? At first glance, there
seems to be little ground for optimism. All indications are that the problem requires
massive public investment. All the political lessons are that this investment is currently impossible. Billions can be voted for defense and for war; even a pittance
for domestic programs requires Herculean battle.
"'Act of May io, 1926, ch. 823, [1926] N.Y. Laws 1507. See generally L. PINr, THE NEw DAY
IN HOUSING 105-14 (1928).
"' N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, z967, at i, col. z (city ed.). Earlier, President Johnson had "ordered the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ... to undertake a pilot program aimed at drawing pri.
vate resources into public housing . . . [to] involve private developers in not only the construction but
also the management of ... projects." N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1967, at I, col. 2. Such a program would
cut criticisms as well as costs.
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Technological breakthrough might act as deus ex machina. After all, even the
poorest enjoy some amenities of life unthinkable for the rich a century ago. Television is an example. In America, millions of relatively poor people can afford
at least a beaten-up nag of a car. This gives freedom, mobility, a chance of change
the peasants of India or the textile workers of Victorian England could hardly have
dreamt of. Will technology find a way to mass-produce housing for the poor? Some
miracle of engineering or science is bound to occur. Experiments in "instant rehabilitation" of slum houses suggest that this is more than a dream.
Technology, however, is no accident. It depends on brute social facts. Innovation flows where it is wanted; it flows where minds and resources have been invested. One can be relatively certain of technological improvement in an industry
or field if there is the social will for improvement, a market for the improved product,
and investment in research and development. Clearly, there is a market for cheap
housing. But there would also be a market for a $ioo new car. The bigger and more
lucrative market is the middle class market. The technological hope is tied in with
the political and social dilemma of slum housing, and welfare in general. Moreover,
technological breakthrough will follow, not precede, massive social investment.
Another possibility is political. The punitive aspects of housing laws were explained, in part, as attempts by government to satisfy maximum demands at minimum price. But some of the classic solutions and responses have begun to pall.
They are not working. Demands are not being satisfied. Unrest seems to be growing.
Profoundly disturbing riots occurred in big cities in the summer of 1967. Both
Negroes and whites appear to have grown more intransigent. Negro militancy
means that a new set of demands, stemming from a group that could once be ignored,
must now be taken into account. The price of law and order has gone up sharply.
Much more output must be allotted by government to the urban poor, if tranquility
is to be preserved. And yet the new output-interracial housing, for example--evokes
rage and even bloodshed in white communities. It may be that there are no cheap
solutions left. The rational course of action may be a difficult and costly one. Investment in slum housing may have to be tripled, quadrupled, to satisfy demands of
Negroes and the poor. At the same time, white opposition may have to be bought off,
too, by heavy investment in the needs of middle class whites-perhaps with better
police protection, schools, street lighting, fire-fighting service. Perhaps bold new
devices will have to be tried-price-supports for the little frame houses on the ghetto
fringe, to lay the haunting fear of "loss of property values" finally to rest. It is not
bigotry but fact that neighborhoods decay when they become Negro ghettoes. The
bigotry consists of the belief that race causes the decay. That the schools deteriorate,
that the police stop policing, that the quality of municipal services go down, that
buildings become crowded-these are facts, not bigotry. They cannot be met with
exhortations. Its costs money to demonstrate that an interracial neighborhood can be
a sound, stable neighborhood. It costs money-not fair housing laws or speeches. But

370

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the politics of urban unrest may eventually drive the country to the point of willingness to spend. And, ultimately, integration and achievement of housing goals means
massive public building or subsidizing-scattered housing, suburban housing, vestpocket housing, not high-rise ghettoes near downtown.
Success in this venture is far from certain. In theory, there is a rational solution to
every social problem. But an elementary glance at human history shows that the
rational solution is not always reached. History is a long dismal tale of wars, disorders, rebellions. It is full of examples of societies that failed to adapt, societies that
never found a way to the optimal solution of their problems. The same may be true of
urban problems of the United States, and particularly problems of slum housing and
the ghetto. Riots, for example, may result not in increased investment but in increased race-hate and increased repression.
As a first step, however, the problem must be stripped of cant, hypocrisy, and
obstructive indignation. It has to be seen in all its political, economic, and social
complexity. The futility of cheap minimal solutions must become apparent. Only
then is there hope of clearing the slums and housing all the people in decent comfort.

